‐constrained incentive Stackelberg games for discrete‐time stochastic systems with multiple followers

The authors discuss an incentive Stackelberg game with one leader and multiple non-cooperative followers, for a class of discrete-time stochastic systems with an external disturbance. In this game, the leader achieves a team-optimal solution by attenuating the external disturbance under their H ∞ constraint, whereas the followers adopt Nash equilibrium strategies according to the leader's incentive Stackelberg strategy set (declared in advance) while considering the worst-case disturbance. Using our proposed method, we demonstrate that the incentive Stackelberg strategy set can be found by solving a set of matrix-valued equations. Techniques are presented for both the finite- and infinite-horizon cases. In addition, through an academic and a practical numerical examples, we verify the efficacy of the proposed method in providing the incentive Stackelberg strategy set.