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RAP: A Ricardian Auctioning Protocol for Demand-Supply Matching using Open Bids

Authors :
Ulf Bodin
Kåre Synnes
Eric Chiquito
Source :
IECON
Publication Year :
2021
Publisher :
IEEE, 2021.

Abstract

In this paper, we define an auction protocol and implementation of a decentralized and distributed auctioning platform for demand-supply matching of components and materials subject to recycling. Auctioning is the process of buying and selling goods or services by offering them up for bid, taking bids, and then selling the item to a winner according to preset rules. Some auction types relies on sealed-bids while others implement an open-bid procedure that allows for multiple bids before a known or unknown deadline. The English auction and its variants is most common type. It relies on that the current highest bid is always available to potential bidders. Online auction platforms are nowadays used to trade various services and goods. We address the iterative negotiations in form of auction bids aiming at signed contractual agreements stated in legal prose and captured by Ricardian contracts. We evaluate our model towards requirements including privacy, transparency and fairness in terms of acknowledged publishing of highest bids and the ordered arrival of individual bids. In addition, we demonstrate the mechanisms for distributed storage of cryptographically signed Ricardian contracts, omitting the need for trusting the auctioneer or relying on a trusted third party for this storage.

Details

Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
IECON 2021 – 47th Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society
Accession number :
edsair.doi...........00961736fcbdfa8b0f818917e2032306
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1109/iecon48115.2021.9589369