Epistemically stable strategy sets

Authors :: Asheim, Geir B.
Voorneveld, Mark
Weibull, Jörgen
Of Economics, Department
Department of Economics [Oslo]
Faculty of Social Sciences [Oslo]
University of Oslo (UiO)-University of Oslo (UiO)
Department of Economics (SSE)
Stockholm School of Economics (SSE)
Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique (X-DEP-ECO)
École polytechnique (X)
Publication Year :: 2009
Publisher :: HAL CCSD, 2009.
Abstract: This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.

Subjects :: Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory
closedness under rational behavior
ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING
epistemic stability
mutual p-belief,Epistemic game theory,epistemic stability,rationalizability,closedness under rational behavior,mutual p-belief
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Computer Science::Multiagent Systems
mutual p-belief
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games
rationalizability
[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Epistemic game theory

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