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Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

Authors :
Kamada, Yuichiro
Fudenberg, Drew
Source :
Theoretical Economics. 10(3)
Publication Year :
2015

Abstract

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.

Details

Volume :
10
Issue :
3
Database :
OpenAIRE
Journal :
Theoretical Economics
Accession number :
edsair.dedup.wf.001..2906dd1da2c3446eacbd263f3c554ba2