Devolving command under conflicting military objectives

Command and Control (C2) arrangements aim to ensure their autonomous but rational commanders act in a way that is consistent with\ud C2's overall objectives. This can be a challenge, especially in scenarios\ud where individual commanders face conflicting objectives: the success of a\ud mission verses the compromise of a campaign. Building on our experiences\ud in observing the reactions of military in simulated conflict, in this paper\ud we demonstrate how multiattribute utility theory can be used to model\ud the effects of such conflicting objectives on a particular commander's actions. We show that the geometrical forms of expected utilities that arise\ud from the assumption of commander rationality are qualitatively stable in\ud a wide range of scenarios and therefore open to analysis. We proceed to\ud demonstrate how an appreciation of this geometry can aid understanding\ud of the relationship between complex operational environments and the\ud C2 arrangements and also inform selection and training of personnel to\ud address such conflicts appropriately.\ud