Competition law enforcement on digital markets—lessons from recent EU case law

This article is set against the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) decisions in Pierre Fabreand Coty Germany GmbH, observing that in the digital economy, price is no longer the sole important parameter of competition and that competition law therefore has to reconstruct the theoretical background required to explain the tensions contained in the design of concentrated marketplaces. As the CJEU’s approach taken in Pierre Fabreand Cotyshows, competition authorities and courts also need to consider the market’s distinct psychological properties when they contemplate the legal framework that governs it. The article thus explains the CJEU’s decisions not against the well-known debate about inter- and intrabrand competition but with reference to the notion of creating distinct types of ‘variety’ in the marketplace so as to enable consumers to choose not just between the alternative options that they face but also to enable them to make decisions that will shape the manner in which they think about whether they should consider alternative options at all. The article’s findings aim to advance debates about the overarching policy goals of the way in which digital markets ought to be regulated.