The new currency boards and discretion: empirical evidence from Bulgaria

In recent years, a number of countries have introduced currency boards (CBs). Gaining in swing and popularity, this newgeneration CB preserves, to varying degrees, the Central Bank’s ability to function as the lender of last resort (LOLR) and to intervene in case of systemic risk. Recently, Central Bank flexibility has been preserved in different forms in Hong Kong, Argentina, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria. Macro- and microeconomic implications of such departures from orthodox CBs have not been thoroughly studied yet. Theoretically, the introduction of this second-generation CB provides an opportunity for conducting discretionary monetary policy (though certainly not in its typical form). Some major, ensuing questions require answers. What are the new channels of monetary policy? Does an orthodox self-regulating (automatic) mechanism work with second-generation CBs? How are monetary disequilibria in the economy adjusted? We define an automatic mechanism as “the presence of a positive cointegration relationship between the overall balance of payments (BOPs) and the reserve money, and the absence of discretionary variables in the model.” The theoretical hypothesis is checked empirically based on Bulgarian data.