Neuroconsciousness: A theoretical framework

The topic of artificial consciousness asks the following question. Were a manufactured object appear to be conscious what mechanisms could be responsible for such a state of affairs? First the paper defines the foundation of the theory as a postulate which requires the manufactured object to be neural, specifying that the firing of someneurons is responsible for conscious states. This leads to the title ‘neuroconsciousness’. It follows this up by a series of 12 corollaries which is open-ended in the belief that a definition of consciousness is an open-ended series of properties. The method of theoretical expression is that of a neural state machine for which the state structure is the product of learning and generalisation. Central to this scheme is a novel concept of ‘iconic’ learning which creates states that are sampled versions of sensory experience. The paper ends with both a technical critique that is directed towards the construction of this type of machinery and a philosophical critique which asks how helpful is the concept of artificial consciousness in elucidating the real thing.