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Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster's Procedure.
- Source :
- AUCO Czech Economic Review; 2012, Vol. 6 Issue 3, p199-208, 10p
- Publication Year :
- 2012
-
Abstract
- In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster's procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- COLLUSION
COALITIONS
RISK aversion
FAIRNESS -- Social aspects
CONFLICT of interests
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 18024696
- Volume :
- 6
- Issue :
- 3
- Database :
- Supplemental Index
- Journal :
- AUCO Czech Economic Review
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 90461437