A hierarchical framework for distributed resilient control of islanded AC microgrids under false data injection attacks.

In this paper, we propose a control scheme to ensure the microgrid control layers are resilient to cyberattacks. The studied microgrid consists of several distributed generation (DG) units and we consider the hierarchical control structure that is common for microgrids. The use of communication channels among DGs has made microgrids more vulnerable and this is where cybersecurity issues arise. In this work we added three algorithms, reputation-based, Weighted Mean Subsequence Reduced (W-MSR) and Resilient Consensus Algorithm with Trusted Nodes (RCA-T), to the secondary control layer of the microgrid and made them resilient to false data injection (FDI) attacks. In reputation-based control, some procedures are used for detecting the attacked DGs and isolating them from the others. W-MSR and RCA-T are Mean Subsequence Reduced (MSR)-based algorithms that fade the effect of attacks without finding them. These algorithms use a simple strategy that ignores some extreme values of neighboring agents, so an attacker can simply get ignored. Our analysis of the reputation-based algorithm is based on scrambling matrices, so the communication graph can switch in a prescribed set. In each of the above cases, to evaluate the performance of the designed controllers, in addition to theoretical analysis, we evaluated and compared the controllers using simulation. • Reputation-based control has a fault detection and isolation mechanism. • W-MSR and RCA-T use a fault-resilient control that make microgrids flexible. • The reputation-based algorithm tolerates switching topologies of communication graph. • The W-MSR and RCA-T algorithms do not require computational complexity on DG level. • The performance is evaluated via simulations in addition to theoretical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]