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Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion.
- Source :
- Philosophical Psychology; Apr2013, Vol. 26 Issue 2, p291-314, 24p, 1 Chart
- Publication Year :
- 2013
-
Abstract
- “There is a thought in me which is not mine.” This is, roughly, the complaint of patients suffering from thought insertion. This first-rank symptom of schizophrenia is particularly puzzling for it seems to challenge a very well entrenched principle to the effect that our conscious thoughts are necessarily subjective, that we necessarily have a sense of ownership for them (Cartesian principle). Despite their wide disagreement, classical accounts of the symptom save the Cartesian principle by interpreting thought insertion as a problem of the sense of agency for thought rather than as a problem of subjectivity. I argue that those accounts fail and that thought insertion really is a problem of subjectivity. We can nevertheless save the Cartesian principle if we realize that the presupposition, shared by classical accounts, to the effect that inserted thoughts are unequivocally conscious, is ill-grounded. Distinguishing between reflexive awareness and phenomenal consciousness, and relying on a careful comparison between thought insertion and other pathologies of agency, I propose a novel account of the symptom which is compatible with the Cartesian principle and which allows to take the patient's reports seriously. This account, I conclude, opens up novel perspectives on the comprehension of schizophrenia, and reveals a common confusion between two different dimensions of the mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- CONSCIOUSNESS
SUBJECTIVITY
THOUGHT insertion
SCHIZOPHRENIA
CARTESIANISM (Philosophy)
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 09515089
- Volume :
- 26
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 86417798
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.625117