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For the Student: Matching and Economic Design.
- Source :
- Australian Economic Review; Feb2012, Vol. 45 Issue 1, p134-141, 8p, 4 Charts
- Publication Year :
- 2012
-
Abstract
- This article presents a brief survey of two-sided matching. We introduce the reader to the problem of two-sided matching in the context of the college admission model and explain two central requirements for a matching mechanism: stability and non-manipulability. We show how the frequently used 'Boston Mechanism' fails these key requirements and describe how an alternative, the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, leads to stable matchings but fails to be non-manipulable in general. A third mechanism, the Top Trading Cycle, is efficient and non-manipulable when only one side of the match acts strategically. We also discuss some applications of matching theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00049018
- Volume :
- 45
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Australian Economic Review
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 72365877
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8462.2011.00666.x