Quandaries in meta-theory: against pluralism.

This article provides an exposition and critique of recent attempts to systematize meta-theoretical issues in the human sciences on the basis of thoroughgoing pluralism and reflexivity. In spite of wholehearted efforts to avoid scientistic justification for what I call 'methodologism', the development of any interesting or robust criteria for cross-theoretical assessment and comparison cannot dispense with some kind of legislative – as against merely optional or descriptive – motivation. Lack of conviction on this score creates impossible quandaries and dilemmas for earnest methodologists. In some ways, the problem with many current 'critical' perspectives on social knowledge making is that they are not (self-)critical enough, turning such no doubt valuable things as reflexivity and pluralism into sacred cows. In the paper, I try to puncture these aspects of post-positivist orthodoxy, and suggest that the rationale for engaging in theoretical activity in the social disciplines requires more basic elaboration than current methodologists offer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]