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WEAKLY BELIEF-FREE EQUILIBRIA IN REPEATED GAMES WITH PRIVATE MONITORING.
- Source :
- Econometrica; May2011, Vol. 79 Issue 3, p877-892, 16p
- Publication Year :
- 2011
-
Abstract
- Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring have a wide range of applications, but a complete characterization of all equilibria in this class of games has yet to be obtained. The existing literature has identified a relatively tractable subset of equilibria. The present paper introduces the notion of weakly belief-free equilibria for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This is a tractable class which subsumes, as a special case, a major part of the existing literature (the belief-free equilibria). It is shown that this class can outperform the equilibria identified by the previous work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- ECONOMIC models
LITERATURE
ECONOMETRICS
ECONOMICS
ECONOMIC equilibrium
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00129682
- Volume :
- 79
- Issue :
- 3
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Econometrica
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 66627339
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA8480