Evolution of cooperative behavior among heterogeneous agents with different strategy representations in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game.

The iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game has frequently been used to examine the evolution of cooperative behavior among agents. When the effect of representation schemes of IPD game strategies was examined, the same representation scheme was usually assigned to all agents. That is, in the literature, a population of homogeneous agents was usually used in computational experiments. In this article, we focus on a slightly different situation where every agent does not necessarily use the same representation scheme. That is, a population can be a mixture of heterogeneous agents with different representation schemes. In computational experiments, we used binary strings of different lengths (i.e., three-bit and five-bit strings) to represent IPD game strategies. We examined the evolution of cooperative behavior among heterogeneous agents in comparison with the case of homogeneous ones for the standard IPD game with typical payoff values of 0, 1, 3, and 5. Experimental results showed that the evolution of cooperative behavior was slowed down by the use of heterogeneous agents. It was also demonstrated that a faster evolution of cooperative behavior is achieved among majority agents than among minority ones in a heterogeneous population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]