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In-Concert Overexpansion and the Precautionary Demand for Bank Reserves.

Authors :
SELGIN, GEORGE
Source :
Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Ohio State University Press); May2001 Part 1, Vol. 33 Issue 2, p294-300, 7p
Publication Year :
2001

Abstract

Economists have long believed that, absent any public withdrawals of high-powered money, an unregulated, closed banking system can expand its assets and liabilities without encountering any shortage of reserves so long as its members act in concert. Notwithstanding its popularity, this "in-concert overexpansion" doctrine is inconsistent with standard theories of the precautionary demand for bank reserves. Unless these theories are themselves incorrect, concerns that complete removal of legal restrictions on the competitive supply of bank money must result in an unstable or indeterminate bank-money multiplier are misplaced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
00222879
Volume :
33
Issue :
2
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Ohio State University Press)
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
4824106
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.2307/2673887