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Deterring Fraud: The Role of Resale Price Maintenance.
- Source :
- Journal of Business; Jul86, Vol. 59 Issue 3, p433-449, 17p
- Publication Year :
- 1986
-
Abstract
- Using a model like that of Klein and Leffler's, we demonstrate theoretically that a manufacturer's desire to signal relative quality differences by relative retail price differences may be thwarted by the misleading markups of independent retailers. Resale price maintenance is one instrument that a manufacturer can use to avoid this problem. We present empirical evidence from a recent antitrust case in which forcing a manufacturer to drop resale price maintenance did lead to mis-leading (and also higher) markups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- FRAUD
COMMERCIAL crimes
PRICING
RETAIL industry
BRAND name products
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00219398
- Volume :
- 59
- Issue :
- 3
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Journal of Business
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 4584649
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1086/296346