Editorial Notes.

One of the most widely studied problems in experimental research on conflict processes is that of eliciting cooperative or non hostile responses from parties who have some instigation toward non cooperative or hostile behavior. The unusually long gaming section in this issue focuses on the effectiveness of various strategies which one player can use to induce cooperative choices by the other player in mixed-motive situations. The extensive concern with the effectiveness of various influence techniques and strategies, evident in the gaming papers, underscores that the costs of exercising influence have been relatively neglected in the study of social power. It also suggests a number of dimensions for measuring the costs of making influence attempts and the costs of complying or not complying with them. The main emphasis on the cost-asymmetry between threats and promises suggests the importance of comparative studies of threats and promises as influence techniques. It also suggests the potential value of expanding the paradigm from the dominant focus on coercive power to a balanced focus on both coercive and reward power, and of expanding it from its predominant focus on effectiveness to a balanced focus on both cost and effectiveness.