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Task assignments and incentives: generalists versus specialists.
- Source :
- RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell); Summer2009, Vol. 40 Issue 2, p380-403, 24p, 5 Charts, 2 Graphs
- Publication Year :
- 2009
-
Abstract
- I develop an agency model of job assignments where jobs differ based on the breadth of tasks. A tradeoff between task complementarities and relative abilities of workers results in those with balanced skills being assigned to multitask jobs. The same tradeoff between complementarities and relative abilities also influences incentives to sort privately informed workers to jobs. I then draw on a variety of sources (survey data, case studies, and anecdotal evidence) to suggest that relative abilities and multitasking play an important role in managerial assignments of nonacademic research scientists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- TASKS
WORK
ACTIVITIES of daily living
TASK performance
WORK structure
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 07416261
- Volume :
- 40
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell)
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 38802338
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00070.x