Europäische Verteilungskonflikte und sozialdemokratische Positionen zum Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialmodell.

Where are the points of agreement and divergence in the positions of social democratic parties in Europe? This question stands at the centre of a survey on the European Economic and Social Model conducted in 17 European countries. On the abstract-programmatic level on some points there is considerable agreement, for example, on the demand for a strengthening of the social dimension of the European Union. Even on a number of concrete political projects there is unanimity within European social democracy (rejection of the country of origin principle in the liberalization of services). The normal case in relation to concrete political proposals is of course great heterogeneity of positions. This divergence can be explained by the dominance of "national" interests over the general party-political interest in a uniform position. These national interests are shaped on the one hand by inter-state distributional interests (net payers vs. net beneficiaries), and on the other hand by the degree of approximation of one's own welfare state and politico-economic model to the model of the core European states (the six founding states): it is only to be expected that a strengthening of the social dimension of the EU would lead to a transfer of this model to EU level. For this reason positions are very heterogeneous, particularly in the case of EU policies which touch on the foundations of national welfare state regimes. As an example we shall present the survey results on the proposals for a co-ordinated wage and employment policy, as well as the institutionalization of a common EU welfare state model. In this connection four groups of countries have crystallized: (i) The states of "old Europe" favor further socio-political integration, even if they must foot the bill as net payers, because they can expect an institutionalization of a welfare state model at EU level which is compatible with their own. (ii) The "cohesion states" (southern Europe plus Ireland) are also relatively open-minded because their own welfare state development has led to an approximation to the continental European model "from below" (iii) The "transition states" of Eastern Europe are rather skeptical because they fear a loss of competitiveness from further EU socio-political integration. (iv) The "euro-skeptics" (Scandinavia and the UK) are equally reluctant. This is due on the one hand to their being net payers, but on the other to the fact that the institutionalization of a common EU social model would go hand in hand with a far-reaching transformation of their own welfare state models. This would trigger conflicts over redistribution and jeopardize the functional integrity of the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]