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Blockwise-Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attack and Online Modes of Encryption.
- Source :
- Cryptography & Coding (978-3-540-77271-2); 2007, p129-151, 23p
- Publication Year :
- 2007
-
Abstract
- Here, we present a generalized notion of online modes of encryption that make one call to a pseudorandom permutation per block of plaintext. This generalization, called "Canonical Form," not only allows for modes of encryption to be written in a common format, but provides for easy proofs of blockwise-adaptive chosen-plaintext (BACPA) security/insecurity. We also develop necessary and sufficient conditions for security of a mode of encryption in Canonical Form. As an application, we write ten modes of encryption in Canonical Form, and we prove the security status (under BACPA) of nine of them. While most of these modes already had proven BACPA security status in previously published papers, it is hoped the more general method specified here will be of use in writing simpler proofs for other modes, including modes of encryption yet to be developed. BACPA is a model for adversaries slightly more powerful than those in traditional chosen-plaintext attack. In particular, instead of forcing the target to encrypt messages of his/her own choosing, the attacker can insert blocks of his/her own choosing into the target's messages [JMV02]. Some modes of encryption which are secure against traditional CPA, for example the ubiquitous Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), are insecure against BACPA. Several papers have been written to explore BACPA and modes of encryption under it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISBNs :
- 9783540772712
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Cryptography & Coding (978-3-540-77271-2)
- Publication Type :
- Book
- Accession number :
- 34227465
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77272-9_9