II — Two Conceivability Arguments Compared.

This paper compares and contrasts two conceivability arguments: the zombie argument (ZA) against physicalism, and the perfect actor argument (AA) against behaviourism. I start the paper by assuming that the arguments are of the same kind, and that AA is sound. On the basis of these two assumptions I criticize the most common philosophical suggestions in the literature today about what is wrong with ZA, and what is right in it. I end the paper by suggesting that the comparison between the two arguments makes plausible an epistemic response to ZA according to which the conceivability of a zombie — that is, someone identical to me in all physical respects but different in some phenomenal respect — is being confused with the conceivability of something else, i.e. someone identical to me in physical respects that are epistemically available, but different in some phenomenal respect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]