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Response to Hoeltje: Davidson Vindicated?
- Source :
- Mind; Jan2007, Vol. 116 Issue 461, p131-141, 11p
- Publication Year :
- 2007
-
Abstract
- In response to Hoeltje I concede the main point of his first section: for each logical truth S of the object language, it is a logical consequence of the Davidsonian theory of meaning I offered in my paper that S is logically true, contrary to what I asserted in the paper. However, I now argue that a Davidsonian theory of meaning may be formulated equally well in such a way that it not a logical consequence of the theory that S is a logical truth. Nonetheless, the revised theory of meaning will still ‘entail’ in a wider sense that S is a logical truth, for we can prove by induction on the consequence class of the revised theory that S is a logical truth. So far, my disagreement with Hoeltje is over the more charitable interpretation of a passage from Davidson. I close by arguing that Davidson was mistaken on one point, a theory of meaning will entail a threefold distinction among the sentences of the object language, not a two- fold distinction as he claimed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00264423
- Volume :
- 116
- Issue :
- 461
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Mind
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 23962934
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzm131