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Existence of nash equilibria for constrained stochastic games.
- Source :
- Mathematical Methods of Operations Research; 2006, Vol. 63 Issue 2, p261-285, 25p
- Publication Year :
- 2006
-
Abstract
- In this paper, we consider constrained noncooperative N-person stochastic games with discounted cost criteria. The state space is assumed to be countable and the action sets are compact metric spaces. We present three main results. The first concerns the sensitivity or approximation of constrained games. The second shows the existence of Nash equilibria for constrained games with a finite state space (and compact actions space), and, finally, in the third one we extend that existence result to a class of constrained games which can be “approximated” by constrained games with finitely many states and compact action spaces. Our results are illustrated with two examples on queueing systems, which clearly show some important differences between constrained and unconstrained games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 14322994
- Volume :
- 63
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Mathematical Methods of Operations Research
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 20791553
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-005-0003-y