EARNING TRADE SECRETS.

Every intellectual property right, like every property Tight generally, has a moment Qf birth. Whether and when that moment occurs depend on doctrines of original acquisition. In most IP regimes, these doctrines are so fundamental that they've been reduced to a single verb. One can get a patent only by inventing, or a copyright only by authoring. The modern law of trade secrecy, however remains strangely quiet on its own rules of original acquisition. While it asks whether the claimed ir® rmation is secret enough and whether the owner is guarding that secret, it sidesteps the basic question of what that would-be owner must do in order to earn legal protection in the Jirst place. That inattention is becoming more troubling. Firms are increasingly weaponizing the broad definition of trade secrets to assert rights over any information that they want to shield from public scrutiny, *om workplace irjury statistics to employee diversity data to consumer complaints. In many cases, the firm made no real effort to develop the information, and in the most egregious ones the firm would rather the information not exist at all. Still, under the black-letter eligibility test, it's not clear that thosefacts would bar a claim. Inl this Article, however we argue that trade secrecy does indeed possess a neglected doctrine of original acquisitionand its proper application could dispose Qfsorne of these perverse claims. In order to receive the legal entitlement, we contend, a claimant must have made some meaningful economic investment in causing the 01/brmation to exist. While tying trade secret protection to development cost has a long pedigree at common lau), it doesn't get the attention it deserves today because it's not mentioned in any governing statute. Yet as we show, many cases nevertheless continue to treat development cost as afreestanding eligibility consideration anyway. Emphasizing investment within trade secrecy's law of original acquisition is a policy lever hiding in plain sight within classical doctrine. While conditioning eligibility on this sort of sweat equity isfamously atfured by both copylight and patent law, we explain why it makes far more sensejor trade secrets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]