Investment preference for either technical or operational energy efficiency measures to achieve sustainable maritime shipping.

The reduction in energy consumption in shipping is a crucial issue to achieve a more sustainable sector. Nevertheless, investments in energy efficiency are inhibited by barriers. Consequently, under a Principal-Agent approach, this study aims to analyze the factors affecting the investment preference for either technical or operational measures. To date, the research problem has barely been addressed from a similar approach. This work further integrates agency theory with the identification of barriers and drivers, as well as the cost–benefit ratio from both an environmental and a financial perspective. This makes it possible to consider shipping management from a more comprehensive perspective. The study sample is current and representative (658 individual bulk carriers). The research was carried out utilizing two binominal logistic models that provide similar results when testing the proposed hypotheses. The outcomes show that regulatory factors, such as the distance of a vessel's technical emissions from EEDI requirements (standardized coefficients: −2.8352 and −2.5069), and Principal-Agent problems, such as split incentives (standardized coefficients: −1.0059 and −0.9828), have the greatest influence on investment preferences. As a consequence of Principal-Agent problems, vessels operating under Time Charter contracts are less likely to invest in technical measures than in operational ones. Verified information and activity promote technical measures. Maritime regulation promotes technical measures in younger vessels, especially those meeting only the minimum requirements. Better knowledge can help achieve a more environmentally responsible shipping sector. The role of shipowners and charterers should be highlighted, and transparency should be promoted to enable well-informed decisions to be made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]