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Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-luminosity Arguments.

Authors :
de Bruijn, David
Source :
Erkenntnis; Dec2024, Vol. 89 Issue 8, p3329-3349, 21p
Publication Year :
2024

Abstract

Epistemological disjunctivists hold that perceiving subjects have "reflective access" to factive perceptual support for belief. However, little has been done to elaborate the intended notion of reflection, or introspective awareness more generally. Moreover, critics have pointed out that the disjunctivist conception of "reflective access" can seem vulnerable to varieties of Williamson's anti-luminosity argument. In this paper I defend disjunctivism from this charge, arguing that it holds the resources for a potent defense of the claim that knowledge of perceptual states is luminous. Indeed, I argue that appreciating the relation between disjunctivism and luminosity sheds critical light on how the disjunctivist conceives of perceptual support for belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
01650106
Volume :
89
Issue :
8
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Erkenntnis
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
180628821
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00680-9