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Economic foraging in a floral marketplace: asymmetrically dominated decoy effects in bumblebees.
- Source :
- Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences; 9/18/2024, Vol. 291 Issue 2031, p1-12, 12p
- Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- While most models of decision-making assume that individuals assign options absolute values, animals often assess options comparatively, violating principles of economic rationality. Such 'irrational' preferences are especially common when two rewards vary along multiple dimensions of quality and a third, 'decoy' option is available. Bumblebees are models of decision-making, yet whether they are subject to decoy effects is unknown. We addressed this question using bumblebees (Bombus impatiens) choosing between flowers that varied in their nectar concentration and reward rate. We first gave bees a choice between two flower types, one higher in concentration and the other higher in reward rate. Bees were then given a choice between these flowers and either a 'concentration' or 'rate' decoy, designed to be asymmetrically dominated on each axis. The rate decoy increased bees' preference in the expected direction, while the concentration decoy did not. In a second experiment, we manipulated choices along two single reward dimensions to test whether this discrepancy was explained by differences in how concentration versus reward rate were evaluated. We found that low-concentration decoys increased bees' preference for the medium option as predicted, whereas low-rate decoys had no effect. Our results suggest that both low- and high-value flowers can influence pollinator preferences in ways previously unconsidered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- BEES
ABSOLUTE value
POLLINATORS
NECTAR
IMPATIENS
BUMBLEBEES
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 09628452
- Volume :
- 291
- Issue :
- 2031
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 179871782
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2024.0843