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Crowding in School Choice.
- Source :
- American Economic Review; Aug2024, Vol. 114 Issue 8, p2526-2552, 27p
- Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- We consider the market design problem of matching students to schools in the presence of crowding effects. These effects are salient in parents' decision-making and the empirical literature; however, they cause difficulties in the design of satisfactory mechanisms and, as such, are not currently considered. We propose a new framework and an equilibrium notion that accommodates crowding, no-envy, and respect for priorities. The equilibrium has a student-optimal element that induces an incentive-compatible mechanism and is implementable via a novel algorithm. Moreover, analogs of fundamental structural results of the matching literature (the rural hospitals theorem, welfare lattice, etc.) survive. (JEL D47, H75, I21, I28) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- RURAL hospitals
SCHOOL choice
EQUILIBRIUM
DECISION making
ALGORITHMS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00028282
- Volume :
- 114
- Issue :
- 8
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- American Economic Review
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 178719961
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220626