Sensor Network Attack Synthesis against Fault Diagnosis of Discrete Event Systems †.

This paper investigates the problem of synthesizing network attacks against fault diagnosis in the context of discrete event systems (DESs). It is assumed that the sensor observations sent to the operator that monitors a system are tampered with by an active attacker. We first formulate the process of online fault diagnosis under attack. Then, from the attack viewpoint, we define a sensor network attacker as successful if it can degrade the fault diagnosis in the case of maintaining itself as undiscovered by the operator. To verify such an attacker, an information structure called a joint diagnoser (JD) is proposed, which describes all possible attacks in a given attack scenario. Based on the refined JD, i.e., stealthy joint diagnoser (SJD), we present an algorithmic procedure for synthesizing a successful attacker if it exists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]