The role of perceived intention as a fast social heuristic for the promotion of collective rationality and increasing human cooperation in an economic game.

In the studies of human cooperation, the problem is always the choice between individual benefit and collective benefit, which is modeled by the game. On the other hand, based on the Dual processing of decision-making, whether cooperative decision-making is the type I or type II has been discussed a lot. Some studies consider cooperative decision-making as type 1 and others as type 2. According to some theories, the human self is inter-subjective, and it is created by the interaction between I and Me. The classical model of game theory does not consider it. In this article, we first enter common sense and intersubjectivity into the game theory model and show that a level of estimation of the intention of the opposite player is necessary for cooperation. Then we show that if the individual perceives himself in a joint situation through the knowledge of the opposite player’s intention, the cooperative decision-making process is carried out Fast, and therefore it must be considered type 1, and if he considers himself as an individual, his decision-making must be considered type 2. As a result, belonging to a social environment has priority over the type of decision-making. The statistical population includes 20 master’s students who each made 100 binary decisions and produced a total of 2000 data. The analysis method is regression analysis. Based on an intersubjective model of game theory the result of the analysis of a linear regression model shows that the response time decreases and the level of cooperation increases significantly as people’s understanding of another’s intention increases, and also the response time increases and the level of cooperation decreases at the same time as this intention decreases. Because collaborative decision-making takes place in an intersubjective space, it is said that it is influenced by common sense before than dual cognitive processing. Therefore, if there is a community of common sense, collective rationality and as result cooperation is internalized and shows itself as system 1. But if there is no common sense, people decide to cooperate or not as separate individual atoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]