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Key distribution scheme for preventing key reinstallation attack in wireless networks.

Authors :
Mahammad, Farooq Sunar
Viswanatham, V. Madhu
Tahseen, Asma
Devi, M. Sharmila
Kumar, M. Amareswara
Source :
AIP Conference Proceedings; 2024, Vol. 3028 Issue 1, p1-6, 6p
Publication Year :
2024

Abstract

Security is the major concern in the wireless networks. These wireless networks are not connected through any type of cables but instead of using these cables this wireless networks use radio waves to connect different devices. Wi-Fi is a technology for this wireless networks to establish the communication between various devices which are based on 802.11 standards. These devices include personal computers, laptops, phones, tablets, video-game consoles etc. These wireless networking is not totally secure because variety of attack methods like jamming, eavesdropping, man-in-the middle attack, key reinstallation attack called as KRACK against the wireless networks. Among these all the attacks, key reinstallation attack(KRACK) is the most powerful attack against the wireless network users to steal the sensitive information of the users like bank account details, email and password. This key reinstallation attack alter the normal communication flaws in cryptographic protocols during 4-way handshake with wireless access point for again installing the key which is already generated by authenticated user. The main purpose of this attack on wireless network is for resetting some parameters related to key such as replay counter, receive counters, and transmit nonces for generating the trap for the victim. This paper includes detail analysis of key reinstallation attack on wireless network and security protocols for wireless network and then proposed a new handshake mechanism for securing wireless networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
0094243X
Volume :
3028
Issue :
1
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
AIP Conference Proceedings
Publication Type :
Conference
Accession number :
178315148
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1063/5.0212685