The Political Economy of Personalized Law: Comment on Omri Ben-Shahar's and Ariel Porat's book "Personalized Law".

The article discusses the concept of personalized law, which involves tailoring legal directives, privileges, and entitlements to align with individual citizens' unique characteristics, needs, and capacities. The author explores the political economy implications of personalized law, highlighting potential risks and benefits. They argue that uniform rules can protect minorities and facilitate the detection of injustice, while personalization undermines social enforcement of rights and undercuts legal activism. The author also raises concerns about the difficulty of rooting out bad personalized law and the potential for personalized law to degenerate into a social credit system. They discuss the intuitive appeal of personalized law to laypeople and the potential depersonalization of the law. The article concludes by suggesting that the case for personalized law may be weaker in constitutional law and calling for further research on the fairness perceptions of laypeople and strategies to offset the fairness gap. [Extracted from the article]