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MANAGERIAL FORESIGHT AND ATTEMPTED RENT APPROPRIATION: INSIDER TRADING ON KNOWLEDGE OF IMMINENT BREAKTHROUGHS.

Authors :
Ahuja, Gautam
Coff, Russell W.
Lee, Peggy M.
Source :
Strategic Management Journal (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) - 1980 to 2009; Sep2005, Vol. 26 Issue 9, p791-808, 18p, 2 Charts
Publication Year :
2005

Abstract

In order to establish a competitive advantage, firms must acquire or create resources at a price below their value in use. Absent pure luck, this requires managers to exercise foresight about a resource's future value and/or complementarities with pre-existing capabilities. This foresight grants managers the opportunity to exploit information asymmetries for personal gain as well as building organizational capabilities. Nevertheless, there is limited research on the extent of foresight or how managers use it. In our study of insider trading, we found that managers purchase stock well before breakthrough patents are filed. We argue for further research on the extent of managerial foresight and how it affects rent generation and appropriation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
01432095
Volume :
26
Issue :
9
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Strategic Management Journal (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) - 1980 to 2009
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
17782341
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.474