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Which Models of Scientific Explanation Are (In)Compatible with Inference to the Best Explanation?
- Source :
- British Journal for the Philosophy of Science; Mar2024, Vol. 75 Issue 1, p209-232, 24p
- Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- In this article, I explore the compatibility of inference to the best explanation (IBE) with several influential models and accounts of scientific explanation. First, I explore the different conceptions of IBE and limit my discussion to two: the heuristic conception and the objective Bayesian conception. Next, I discuss five models of scientific explanation with regard to each model's compatibility with IBE. I argue that Kitcher's unificationist account supports IBE; Railton's deductive–nomological–probabilistic model, Salmon's statistical-relevance model, and van Fraassen's erotetic account are incompatible with IBE; and Salmon's causal–mechanical model is merely consistent with IBE. In short, many influential models of scientific explanation do not support IBE. I end by outlining three possible conclusions to draw: (1) either philosophers of science or defenders of IBE have seriously misconstrued the concept of explanation, (2) philosophers of science and defenders of IBE do not use the term 'explanation' univocally, and (3) the ampliative conception of IBE, which is compatible with any model of scientific explanation, deserves a closer look. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- SCIENTIFIC models
EXPLANATION
CONCEPTION
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 00070882
- Volume :
- 75
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 177047899
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1086/715203