The impact of governmental accounting standards on public-sector pension funding.

The funding policy for defined benefit pension plans covering government employees represents an important decision for governments sponsoring those plans. Many state and local government plans have become severely underfunded (e.g., New Jersey, Illinois, and Detroit), raising concerns about whether governments are contributing enough to their pensions. Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statements 67/68 (GASB 67/68) fundamentally alter the financial reporting of pension liabilities, by (i) requiring pension liabilities to be estimated using a potentially lower discount rate (increasing estimated liabilities and any funding deficits), and (ii) mandating balance sheet recognition of funding deficits/surpluses. Although GASB 67/68 only change financial reporting and acknowledge specifically that funding is outside their scope, we find, for 100 large state-administered plans, that governments increase pension contributions significantly upon applying GASB 67/68. This funding response is stronger from governments likely to face greater political consequences once pension deficits are made prominent by GASB 67/68. Benefit cuts are also more likely post GASB 67/68, but plans that increase funding are less likely to cut benefits—suggesting that these responses substitute for each other and that pension funding is more of a fiscal priority in some states than others. Overall, our findings suggest that purely accounting changes can have "real" effects on governmental pension policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]