A Lightweight, Efficient, and Physically Secure Key Agreement Authentication Protocol for Vehicular Networks.

In the contemporary era, Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) have emerged as a vital technology in intelligent transportation systems, substantially enhancing the overall travel experience by providing advanced services to vehicles while ensuring driver safety. Despite the notable improvements, the inherent complexity of VANETs presents persistent security challenges, encompassing issues such as privacy preservation for vehicles, message authentication, and constraints in computational power and network bandwidth. Various authentication protocols have been designed for VANETs. However, many of these protocols exhibit significant vulnerabilities, rendering them insecure and unreliable in the face of diverse security threats, such as denial of service, replay, forgery, and impersonation attacks. Moreover, some existing schemes encounter limitations, including high computational complexity and the introduction of additional communication overhead and computational costs. To tackle these concerns, we designed a lightweight and secure identity authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography with the objective of furnishing an effective and secure data transmission mechanism across a public communication channel for the Internet of Vehicles. In addition, we introduce Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to ensure physical layer security during the communication process. A detailed security analysis demonstrates that the proposed protocol is resilient against various attacks. Through a comparative analysis with existing relevant protocols, in scenarios with a high density of vehicles, the algorithm demonstrates significantly lower computational costs and communication overhead than the related protocols, indicating that the proposed protocol is lightweight and efficient. Consequently, the empirical findings indicate that our protocol surpasses others in terms of reliability, user convenience, and practicality for ensuring secure data transmission within VANETs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]