Exploiting Ultimatum Power When Responders Are Better Informed − Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Conflict Resolution.

MLA

Güth, Werner, et al. “Exploiting Ultimatum Power When Responders Are Better Informed − Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Conflict Resolution.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 68, no. 2/3, Feb. 2024, pp. 381–403. EBSCOhost, https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231167846.

APA

Güth, W., Marazzi, F., & Panaccione, L. (2024). Exploiting Ultimatum Power When Responders Are Better Informed − Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Conflict Resolution. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 68(2/3), 381–403. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231167846

Chicago

Güth, Werner, Francesca Marazzi, and Luca Panaccione. 2024. “Exploiting Ultimatum Power When Responders Are Better Informed − Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Conflict Resolution.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 68 (2/3): 381–403. doi:10.1177/00220027231167846.