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Physicalism or Anti-physicalism: A Disjunctive Account.
- Source :
- Erkenntnis; Jan2024, Vol. 89 Issue 1, p223-239, 17p
- Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- In this paper, we make a case for the disjunctive view of phenomenal consciousness: consciousness is essentially disjunctive in being either physical or non-physical in the sense that it has both physical and non-physical possible instances. We motivate this view by showing that it undermines two well-known conceivability arguments in philosophy of mind: the zombie argument for anti-physicalism, and the anti-zombie argument for physicalism. By appealing to the disjunctive view, we argue that two hitherto unquestioned premises of these arguments are false. Furthermore, making use of the resources of this view, we formulate distinct forms of both physicalism and anti-physicalism. On these formulations, it is easy to see how physicalists and anti-physicalists can accommodate the modal intuitions of their opponents regarding zombies and anti-zombies. We conclude that these formulations of physicalism and anti-physicalism are superior to their more traditional counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- MATERIALISM
PHENOMENALISM
CONSCIOUSNESS
PHILOSOPHY of mind
ARGUMENT
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 01650106
- Volume :
- 89
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Erkenntnis
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 175138566
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00530-0