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Committee-Based Blockchains as Games between Opportunistic Players and Adversaries.
- Source :
- Review of Financial Studies; Feb2024, Vol. 37 Issue 2, p409-443, 35p
- Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- We study consensus in a protocol capturing in a simplified manner the major features of the majority of Proof of Stake blockchains. A committee is formed; one member proposes a block; and the others can check its validity and vote for it. Blocks with a majority of votes are produced. When an invalid block is produced, the stakes of the members who voted for it are "slashed." Profit-maximizing members interact with adversaries seeking to disrupt consensus. When slashing is limited, free-riding and moral-hazard lead to invalid blocks in equilibrium. We propose a protocol modification producing only valid blocks in equilibrium. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix , which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- BLOCKCHAINS
COMMITTEES
GAMES
COMPUTER network protocols
ALGORITHMS
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 08939454
- Volume :
- 37
- Issue :
- 2
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 174950077
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhad051