Reputation compensation for incentive alignment in a supply chain with trade credit under information asymmetry.

This paper examines a two-period dynamic contracting in a supply chain under information asymmetry, where a supplier sells a product to a retailer via a trade credit contract. It is found that the retailer always prefers to conceal her actual cost information thus signal as a higher-cost type in the first period to pursue a higher information rent, which would decrease the supplier's profit and thereby the overall profit of the supply chain. To mitigate this ratchet effect, we introduce a reputation compensation mechanism in the two-period trade credit setting. This mechanism could alleviate the information asymmetry to a certain extent as there exists a threshold that incentivizes the retailer to share her true cost information in the earlier period. Moreover, the retailer might claim as a lower-cost type when the supplier offers a relatively higher reputation compensation to take full advantage of her information. Therefore, the supplier should provide trade credit with a reasonable reputation compensation in a two-period setting to enhance his expected profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]