On the Interplay of Production Flexibility, Capital Structure, and Investment Timing.

Problem definition: Modern technologies have made it viable for firms to lower the costs of switching on and off production in response to market changes. In this paper, we explore how production start–stop flexibility impacts joint operating policies, financing, and investment timing decisions. Methodology/results: We develop a continuous-time, optimal stopping model in which equity holders of the firm make operational decisions regarding pausing and restarting production as well as when to default. The degree of production flexibility is measured by switching costs. On the one hand, production flexibility influences the trade-off between tax shields and default costs for the capital structure decision; on the other hand, debt levels impact the equity holders' incentive to use flexibility by pausing and restarting operations. We find that optimal debt usage is not monotone in production flexibility. Specifically, when switching costs are in a low region, the optimal debt level decreases slowly as switching costs increase. As switching costs increase into an intermediate region, the optimal debt level decreases sharply because the firm needs to reduce its debt to ensure the equity holders maintain flexible operating policies. However, when switching costs exceed a threshold, the cost of compromising the use of debt becomes excessive, and the firm substantially increases its debt to gain the full benefit of the tax shield; in so doing, the equity holders forgo flexibility and maintain production continuously until default. This financing strategy affects the firm's investment timing decision, which also exhibits a nonmonotone pattern. Managerial implications: When a firm optimizes the debt usage and investment timing, the incentive of utilizing flexibility embedded in the production technology by the equity holders needs to be taken into account. Our findings also reveal new benefits and guidance for the potential design of incentive contracts to mitigate agency costs. Funding: Q. Wu was supported by Weatherhead School of Management Intramural [Grant IG121420-05-QXW132] for this research. Supplemental Material: The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0213. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]