Income distribution, productivity growth, and workers' bargaining power in an agent-based macroeconomic model.

We investigate the effect of labor productivity growth, workers' bargaining power, and legal minimum wage revision rules on income distribution in a novel agent-based macroeconomic model mostly inspired by the post-Keynesian literature. Its main novelties are a wage bargaining process and a mark-up adjustment rule featuring a broader set of dimensions and coupled channels of interaction. The former allows nominal wages to be endogenously determined by interactions involving firms and workers, which are mediated by workers' bargaining power. The latter assumes that firms also consider their position relative to workers (through their unit costs) to set their mark-up rates, thus linking the evolution of nominal wages in the bargaining process and labor productivity growth to the functional income distribution. This has implications for the personal income distribution through a three-class structure for households. The model reproduces numerous stylized facts, including those concerning the income distribution dynamics. By capturing the inherent social conflict over the distribution of income, our results show the importance of the coevolutionary interaction between workers' bargaining power and productivity growth to the dynamics of income inequality and to its relationship with output. This leads to a policy dilemma between promoting productivity growth and improving income equality which can, nonetheless, be attenuated by combining policies and institutions that protect workers with policies that stimulate technological innovation and productivity growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]