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Delegated Monitoring, Institutional Ownership, and Corporate Misconduct Spillovers.

Authors :
Lel, Ugur
Martin, Gerald S.
Qin, Zhongling
Source :
Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis; Jun2023, Vol. 58 Issue 4, p1547-1581, 35p
Publication Year :
2023

Abstract

Upon the revelation of corporate misconduct by firms in their portfolios, institutional investors experience a significant discount in the market value of their portfolios, excluding misconduct firms, creating a short-term spillover that averages $92.7 billion losses per year. We examine an expansive set of channels under which this spillover to nontarget firms can occur, and find that it reflects the loss of the embedded value of monitoring by a common institutional owner, enforcement wave activity, and industry peer and business relationships. Institutional investors also experience a significant abnormal outflow of funds in the year following the misconduct event. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
English
ISSN :
00221090
Volume :
58
Issue :
4
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
164399245
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109022000886