Quantum Attacks on 1K-AES and PRINCE.

By introducing the BHT algorithm into the slide attack on 1K-AES and the related-key attack on PRINCE, we present the corresponding quantum attacks in this paper. In the proposed quantum attacks, we generalize the BHT algorithm to the situation where the number of marked items is unknown ahead of time. Moreover, we give an implementation scheme of classifier oracle based on Quantum Phase Estimation algorithm in presented quantum attacks. The complexity analysis shows that the query complexity, time complexity and memory complexity of the presented quantum attacks are all |$\mathcal{O}(2^{n/3})$| when the success probability is about |$63\%$|⁠ , where |$n$| is the block size. Compared with the corresponding classical attacks, the proposed quantum attacks can achieve subquadratic speed-up under the same success probability no matter on query complexity, time complexity or memory complexity. Furthermore, the query complexity of the proposed quantum slide attack on 1K-AES is less than Grover search on 1K-AES by a factor of |$2^{n/6}.$| When compared with the Grover search on PRINCE, the query complexity of the presented quantum attack on PRINCE is reduced from |$\mathcal{O}(2^{n})$| to |$\mathcal{O}(2^{n/2}).$| When compared with the combination of Grover and Simon's algorithms on PRINCE, the query complexity of our quantum attack on PRINCE is reduced from |$\mathcal{O}(n\cdot 2^{n/2})$| to |$\mathcal{O}(2^{n/2}).$| Besides, the proposed quantum slide attack on 1K-AES indicates that the quantum slide attack could also be applied on Substitution-Permutation Network construction, apart from the iterated Even-Mansour cipher and Feistel constructions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]