Identity-Based Encryption With Continuous Leakage-Resilient CCA Security From Static Complexity Assumption.

Although a large number of provably secure cryptographic primitives have been proposed in the literature, many of these schemes might be broken in practice because of various leakage attacks. Therefore, the leakage resilience should be considered in designing these primitives. However, in identity-based cryptography, most of the existing leakage-resilient identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes suffer some limitations: they either resist the leakage attacks in the selective identity security model or achieve the chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) security based on a non-static assumption. In this paper, an IBE scheme with adaptive leakage-resilient CCA security is proposed, and its security is rigorously proved in the random oracle model under a classic static complexity assumption, e.g. decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption. In our construction, all elements of ciphertext are randomly distributed in the adversary's view. Hence, the adversary cannot obtain any useful information of the user's private key from the given ciphertexts. Moreover, a unique property of our construction is that the leakage parameter is independent of the plaintext space, which contributes a better leakage rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]