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High-security Lightweight RFID Triple Authentication Protocol Based on PUF.

Authors :
FAN Wenbing
CHANG Zhengtai
AI Lulin
KONG Dehan
Source :
Journal of Zhengzhou University: Engineering Science; 2023, Vol. 44 Issue 2, p46-52, 7p
Publication Year :
2023

Abstract

To solve the difficult tradeoff between security requirements and resource cost in radio frequency identification (RFID) triple authentication protocol, a PUF-based high-security lightweight RFID triple authentication protocol (PHL-RTAP) was proposed. Physical unclonable function (PUF) was utilized to authenticate the tag identity for protecting the tag from physical cloning attacks and reducing the tag cost, meeting the demand of resource-constrained RFID system. The quadratic residual algorithm was adopted to secure the reader data privacy. Random numbers were introduced to resist replay attacks and ensure the anonymity and untraceability of tags and readers. The PHL-RTAP could realize a complete triple authentication between server, reader and tag, and expand the scale of readers and tags in RFID systems according to different requirements, so that it was suitable for large-scale tag RFID system. Security analysis showed that PHL-RTAP could effectively resist various malicious attacks such as tracking attacks, replay attacks, physical cloning attacks and desynchronization attacks. BAN logic analysis and AVISPA tool were used to verify the security of the protocol. Compared with recent protocols, PHL-RTAP could make up for the security defects of similar RFID protocols, and has low resource costs such as computing cost, tag storage cost, and communication cost. PHL-RTAP could achieve both high security and lightweight, and was suitable for resource-constrained RFID triple authentication scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details

Language :
Chinese
ISSN :
16716833
Volume :
44
Issue :
2
Database :
Complementary Index
Journal :
Journal of Zhengzhou University: Engineering Science
Publication Type :
Academic Journal
Accession number :
162521872
Full Text :
https://doi.org/10.13705/j.issn.1671-6833.2023.02.002