A strategic analysis of incorporating corporate environmental responsibility into managerial incentive design: a differential game approach.

As corporations' environmental impacts come under greater scrutiny from global financial, regulatory, and societal stakeholders, management scholars have increasingly focused on the role corporate governance plays in undertaking corporate environmental responsibility (CER). This paper combines managerial incentives and CER in a dynamic environment to formulate a differential game model of managerial incentive design in a duopolistic market, investigating whether companies with profit-maximizing interests are motivated to provide their professional managers with incentives related to CER and the impact of such incentives on corporate profitability, social welfare and emissions reduction. The results demonstrate the following: (1) Employing professional managers increases the emissions reduction efforts of firms and giving incentives to professional managers further increases the emissions reduction level of firms. (2) When a firm employs a professional manager and pays him or her a fixed salary, it generates slightly less income than it does when a manager is not employed; however, if the professional manager is given CER-related incentives, the firm's income is greatly increased. (3) As long as professional managers are employed, social welfare increases regardless of whether professional managers are given incentive pay. (4) The emissions reduction of a firm increases with an increase in the income distribution coefficient π₁. This paper extends the existing CER decision-making model by considering different managerial incentive designs, providing new insights into CER and enterprise organizational strategy and offering useful policy recommendations and a scientific basis for environmental governance, which is expected to be useful for finding ways to balance economic development and environmental protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]