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Imputability, answerability, and the epistemic condition on moral and legal culpability.
- Source :
- European Journal of Philosophy; Dec2022, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p1440-1457, 18p
- Publication Year :
- 2022
-
Abstract
- This paper has two main goals. The first is to defend a particular account of answerability according to which a person is (morally or criminally) answerable for their conduct if it is (morally or criminally) wrongful under the same description under which it is imputable to their agency. Negating defences in law aim to defeat criminal answerability by negating some element of the charged offence while their moral analogues aim to defeat moral answerability by defeating the aptness of the description under which an action is imputed. In contrast, affirmative defences and their moral analogues aim to defeat the move from answerability to liability to sanction by offering an exculpatory explanation for the wrongful conduct. The second goal of this paper is to argue that there are important differences between the way that ignorance functions in negating defences and their moral analogues and affirmative defences and their moral analogues. Specifically, when ignorance functions to defeat answerability, it need only be sincere, but it is typically limited to matters of fact, whereas both moral and non‐moral ignorance can excuse one from liability but only if non‐culpable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Subjects :
- MORAL agent (Philosophy)
CRIMINALS
CONDUCT of life
ETHICS
BEHAVIOR
Subjects
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 09668373
- Volume :
- 30
- Issue :
- 4
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- European Journal of Philosophy
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 160853523
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12763