Inference about quantitative traits under selection: a Bayesian revisitation for the post-genomic era.

Background: Selection schemes distort inference when estimating differences between treatments or genetic associations between traits, and may degrade prediction of outcomes, e.g., the expected performance of the progeny of an individual with a certain genotype. If input and output measurements are not collected on random samples, inferences and predictions must be biased to some degree. Our paper revisits inference in quantitative genetics when using samples stemming from some selection process. The approach used integrates the classical notion of fitness with that of missing data. Treatment is fully Bayesian, with inference and prediction dealt with, in an unified manner. While focus is on animal and plant breeding, concepts apply to natural selection as well. Examples based on real data and stylized models illustrate how selection can be accounted for in four different situations, and sometimes without success. Results: Our flexible "soft selection" setting helps to diagnose the extent to which selection can be ignored. The clear connection between probability of missingness and the concept of fitness in stylized selection scenarios is highlighted. It is not realistic to assume that a fixed selection threshold t holds in conceptual replication, as the chance of selection depends on observed and unobserved data, and on unequal amounts of information over individuals, aspects that a "soft" selection representation addresses explicitly. There does not seem to be a general prescription to accommodate potential distortions due to selection. In structures that combine cross-sectional, longitudinal and multi-trait data such as in animal breeding, balance is the exception rather than the rule. The Bayesian approach provides an integrated answer to inference, prediction and model choice under selection that goes beyond the likelihood-based approach, where breeding values are inferred indirectly. Conclusions: The approach used here for inference and prediction under selection may or may not yield the best possible answers. One may believe that selection has been accounted for diligently, but the central problem of whether statistical inferences are good or bad does not have an unambiguous solution. On the other hand, the quality of predictions can be gauged empirically via appropriate training-testing of competing methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]